NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 55
Number 1 Bicentennial Issue

Article 15

9-1-1976

Constitutional Law -- Prison Disciplinary
Proceedings and the Fifth Amendment Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination
Ellen Kabcenell Wayne

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Ellen K. Wayne, Constitutional Law -- Prison Disciplinary Proceedings and the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 55
N.C. L. Rev. 254 (1976).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol55/iss1/15

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

Constitutional Law-Prison Disciplinary Proceedings and the
Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Any determination of the rights retained by prison inmates is
complex because of the conflict between the interest in maintaining the
basic fair treatment assured all individuals by constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and protections and the competing interest of the state
in allowing prison officials sufficient discretion to administer a .safe
and effective prison system.' Prison disciplinary proceedings, in which
officials can impose removal of good time credits,2 punitive segregation'
or other lesser punishments 4 for infractions of prison regulations, bring
this problem into still sharper focus. The prisoner is in danger of a
substantial loss of liberty in a procedure in which he is unprotected by
the rights guaranteed to a defendant outside prison walls. Prison authorities, on the other hand, confront an individual suspected of rejecting
their regulations and controls and therefore posing a serious threat to
order and security within the institution.
In a 1974 case, Wolff v. McDonnell,5 the United States Supreme
Court examined prison disciplinary hearings for the first time and' held
that the due process rights of inmates are limited to those that pose little
or no threat to the prison administration or the state's interest." In
7 the Court was presented with the issue whether the
Baxter v. Palmigiano
1. Discretion is necessary primarily to allow prison officials to act quickly to preserve control and to provide effective rehabilitation, security and a safe environment for
prison employees as well as inmates. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-63
(1974).
2. Good time credits are granted in many prison systems for time served in prison
without disciplinary sanctions, and reduce the length of sentence remaining to be served.
Notte, ConstitutionalLaw-ProceduralDue Process in Prison Disciplinary ProceedingsThe Supreme Court Responds, 53 N.C.L. REv. 793, 793-94 (1975). See generally
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
3. Punitive segregation or solitary confinement generally consists of restriction to
a cell either full time or for most of each day, without opportunities for recreation or
exercise and sometimes with a reduced diet -and reduced access to reading matter.
U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 50 (1967).

4. The lesser punishment most commonly used is loss of privileges for a given
period of time. Id. See also Proposed Regulations Governing Procedures at the Adult
Correctional Institutions, Rhode Island, reprinted in Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp.
857, 874 app. (D.R.I. 1970).
5. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
6. See text accompanying notes 40-44 infra.
7. 96 S. Ct. 1551 (1976).
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fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination" forbids the taking

of a negative inference from the silence of a prisoner at a disciplinary
hearing to which the privilege against self-incrimination applies.9
lit holding that such an inference is permissible,'0 the Court decreased

the protection provided by -the fifth amendment in the prison context,
and in so doing took a further step in the process of limiting the rights

of imprisoned individuals.
In Baxter the Court jointly considered two United States Court of
Appeals cases challenging the constitutionality of prison disciplinary

proceedings under 42 U.S.C. section 1983." The first, Clutchette v.
Procunier,'2 was an action brought by inmates of the California penal
institution at San Quentin. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of California found that the disciplinary proceedings

violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because
they denied counsel to prisoners. Because of this denial the prisoners
were forced to give up their constitutional privilege against self-incrim-

ination in order to present a defense that could otherwise have been
presented for them by a lawyer while they remained silent.' 3 In its
final consideration of the case,' 4 -the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed, holding that -an inmate faced with any form of disci-

pline was entitled to notice of claimed violations, an opportunity to be
heard and present witnesses, a hearing before a detached and neutral
body, and a decision based on evidence introduced at the hearing.' 5
The court also held that prison officials could, in their discretion, refuse
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V in pertinent part provides: "[Nior shall [any person]
be compelled in any &riminal case to be a witness against himself ...
9. 96 S. Ct. at 1556.
10. Id. at 1558-59. Justice White wrote the opinion for the majority, with Justices
Brennan and Marshall concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Stevens did
not take part in the decision.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
12. 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
13. Id. at 777-78.
14. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit originally held that the minimum
due process requirements for parole and probation revocations applied to disciplinary
proceedings as well. 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974). After the Supreme Court decision
in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), rehearing was granted and the court of
appeals' final decision was reported at 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1975).
15. 510 F.2d at 614, aff'g in part 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974).
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to provide an opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination, but
written reasons for that denial were to be given to the prisoner or the
denial would act as "prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion."' 0
Finally, the court affirmed the district court's holding that Miranda v.
Arizona7 secured a prisoner's right to counsel in a disciplinary proceeding for activity violating state criminal laws as well as prison regula8
tions.'
In the second case, Nicolas A. Palmigiano, an inmate of the
Rhode Island Correction Institution, faced a disciplinary hearing for inciting a disturbance within the prison.' 9 Prior to the hearing Palmigiano
was informed that he might be prosecuted for a violation of Rhode Island
criminal law, and -that he could consult with his attorney but that the
attorney could not be present during the hearing itself. He was also
advisedithat he had a right to remain silent 'but that his silence would be
held against him in the proceeding. Following the disciplinary hearing
at which he remained silent, Palmigiano was placed in solitary confinement for thirty days and had his classification status downgraded. Palmigiano sued, claiming the proceeding violated his rights under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution.2"
The United States District Court denied relief. 2 The original decision
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,2" a reversal of the district
court, was vacated by the Supreme Court in view of its decision in
Wolff.28 On remand, the First Circuit reaffirmed its initial holding, 4
finding that Palmigiano's fourteenth amendment due process rights were
violated by the disciplinary procedure.2 5 Furthermore it held that the
protections required by Miranda and Mathis v. United States 0 to safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination in a custodial interrogation,
16. 510 F.2d at 616.
17. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18. 510 F.2d at 616.
19. Palmigiano, an inmate serving a life sentence for murder, was charged with
urging other prisoners not to return to their cells for lock-up in the evening in order
to register protest for the failure of the prison administration to provide medical assistance for a fellovi prisoner who was violently ill. Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280,
1281 (lst Cir. 1973).
20. 96 S.'Ct. at 1555.
21. Id. The district court decision is unreported.
22. Palnigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973).
23. 418 U.S. 908 (1974).
24. 510 F.2d 534 (1st Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
25. Id. at 537.
26. 391 U.S. 1 (1968). See text accompanying note 69 infra.
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including the presence of counsel, should have been provided to Palmi27
giano in light of the possibilities of future criminal 'prosecution.
The Supreme Court reversed in both cases,28 stating that Wolffs
limitation of the right to counsel at prison disciplinary hearings encompassed all such hearings, regardless of .the possibility of future criminal
prosecutions, and that neither Mirandanor Mathis was applicable since
disciplinary proceedings are "not part of a criminal prosecution. ' 29 The
Court further held that the practice of informing a prisoner of his rig ht
to remain silent but stating also that his silence would be used against
him is invalid neither per se nor as applied in a civil proceeding of this
sort."° The Court first reasoned that the fifth amendment does not
apply to prevent the taking of adverse inferences from silence in civil
actions, although it does forbid such an inference in a criminal case."
The Court then rejected the argument that Baxter fit within a group of
civil cases3 2 in which an inference of guilt taken from defendants' fifth
amendment silence in the'face of official questions had been invalidated,
differentiating between those civil cases and the instant case on the
ground that Palmigiano's silence alone did not automatically subject him
to discipline.3 3 Finally, the Court reiterated that "[m]utual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of
the Constitution that are of general application" is necessary, and that
this -accommodation will limit the standard of rights necessary to con34
stitute due process in all prison disciplinary hearings.
The Supreme Court first utilized the "mutual accommodation" balancing process in the area of prison-related discipline in Morrissey v.
27. 510 F.2d at 536-37.
28. 96 S. Ct. at 1560-61.
29. Id. at 1556, citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).
30. 96 S. Ct. at 1558-59.
31. Id. at 1557-58.
32. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273
(1968); Sanitation Men v. Sanitatioh Comm'r, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). See text accompanying notes 55-59 infra.
33. 96 S. Ct. at 1556-57. The majority opinion also'reexamined the due process
issue presented in Wolff in this changed context and reaffirmed the denial of cross-examination and confrontation to prisoners, refusing to require prison officials to provide
written explanation of their discretionary decisions to forbid such actions. Id. at 1559.
Further, the Court held unanimously that any holding regarding minimum due process
standards when inmates are threatened with loss of privileges rather than the more serious forms of discipline would be premature on these facts. Id. at 1560. The Court
also held that the district court inappropriately treated Clutchette v. Procunier.asa class
action within the contemplation of rules 23(c)(1) and 23(c)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure without certifying it as such and identifying the class. Id. at 1554
n.1.
34. Id. at 1559, citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
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Brewer." The Court found in that case that due process applies to
parole revocation hearings. After weighing and balancing governmental
interests in efficient, inexpensive proceedings, as well as in the parolee's
rehabilitation,3 6 with the parolee's private interest, the parolee's due
process rights were found to include: (1) preliminary and final hearings
before neutral and detached bodies, (2) written notice of alleged violations, (3) the opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses
and documents, (4) the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and (5) a written statement of the evidentiary basis and
reasons for revocation. 3 7 Gagnon v. Scarpelli8 applied similar due
process requirements to probation revocation actions.39
In Wolff v. McDonnell"° the Court declined to extend the full range
of Gagnon-Morrissey due process requirements to disciplinary procedures for acts occurring within the prison that could lead to confinement
in disciplinary cells and deprivation of good-time credits. 41 In view of
the state's strong interest in maintaining order within the prison and in
the rehabilitation of prisoners4 2 the process of mutual accommodation
in such instances creates less stringent due process requirements: (1)
notice of the charges in sufficient time to prepare a defense, (2) opportunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence if it will not be
hazardous to the safety or correctional goals of the prison, and (3) a
written statement of findings of fact and reasons for the imposition of
discipline.4 3 The right of confrontation and cross-examination and the
35. 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
36. The government interest in rehabilitation can be used not only to cut down
on the absolute right to counsel in order to make disciplinary hearings more adversary
and less corrective, but also to support a great many other due process rights on the
grounds that unfair treatment will have a negative effect on a parolee's attitudes and
greatly decrease his chances of successful rehabilitation. 408 U.S. at 484. See also
U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMm'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 83 (1967); Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REV. 795, 830 (1969).
37. 408 U.S. at 489.
38. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
39. Gagnon also added a requirement of counsel when the state authorities found
a trained advocate would be necessary to present fairly the probationer's side of the case.
Right to counsel is presumed in a number of situations. Id. at 783-91.
40. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
41. Id. at 563-72.
42. In Baxter the state goal of rehabilitation was used by the Court solely as a
rationale for cutting back the due process requirements. The arguments of note 36
supra seem to have been abandoned on the ground that rehabilitation is best promoted
by a rapid, non-adversary hearing, even though the prisoner's belief in the fairness of
the proceeding may be decreased.
43. 418 U.S. at 564-67. For criticism of this view see Millemann, Prison Disciplinary Hearingsand ProceduralDue Process, 31 MD. L. Rv. 27, 42 (1971).
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right to-counsel were found not to be required by due process on the
grounds that these rights would produce delay, put an adversary cast

on the proceeding that would reduce its rehabilitative value, and limit
the discretion of the prison administration in such a way as to compromise the security of the institution."
Although the rights of prisoners have only been considered by the
Supreme Court in the recent past, 48 the fifth amendment privilege

against self-incrimination has a long history of protection by the federal
courts. 46

According to its language, the fifth amendment applies only

to criminal trials.
One of its primary purposes is to protect against
inquisitorial abuses of widespread government interrogation and investigation. 48 If the criminal limitation were strictly applied, however, the
fifth amendment would be robbed of its effectiveness since incriminatory
answers could be demanded in non-criminal "investigatory" procedures

and then utilized in a criminal trial with the very effect that the amendment is designed to avoid. 49 Theoretically, the privilege against self-

incrimination should protect any person who is being coerced by governmental authorities to testify to matters that might tend to incriminate
him. 50 The protection extends not only to questions whose answers are

incriminating per se, but to those whose answers would contain information that could either constitute a "link in the chain" of evidence that
might incriminate defendant or give the authorities information that
could reasonably be expected to lead to the discovery of such evidence.'
44. 418 U.S. at 567-70.
45. The federal courts have traditionally been reluctant to respond to inmate complaints and interfere with prison administration. See generally Comment, Beyond the
Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963); Note, ConstitutionalRights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985 (1962).
46. See, e.g., Arndstein v. McCarthy; 254 U.S. 71 (1920); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
47. See note 8 supra for the relevant text. The fifth amendment protection against
self-incrimination was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment
in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
48. Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
24 U. CHm. L. REv. 472, 484 (1957). The privilege originated in England as a response
to the procedures of the Star Chamber, which not only demanded that defendants give
testimony that would lead to their convictions, but which tortured those who refused to
speak under oath. E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFm AMENDMENT TODAY 2-4 (1955).
49. Note, Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 52
VA.L. REv. 322, 323 (1966).
50. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). See also Ratner, supra note
48, at 493.
51. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52 (1964); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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The protection does not extend to prevent a defendant who remains
silent from being damaged by the presence of unrefuted evidence tending
to show his guilt. The natural inference arising out of the presence of
such evidence 52 creates a dilemma for the defendant who must choose
between presenting a defense and exercising his self-incrimination privilege. However, the inference taken from unrefuted evidence has generally been considered to be insufficiently coercive to create a threat to the
fifth amendment privilege. Commentators have suggested that the inference is constitutionally acceptable because it arises out of the strength
of the evidence presented and not out of defendant's exercise of his constitutional right.53
The fifth amendment does not forbid self-incrimination altogether.
Rather, it forbids any governmental action that would coerce a citizen
to incriminate himself involuntarily.5 4 The Supreme Court has recently
invalidated two types of behavior that impermissibly threatened the free
use of the fifth amendment privilege. In Griffin v. California" the
Court held it to be unconstitutionally coercive to advise juries that they
can draw an unfavorable inference from defendant's silence at his criminal trial. Such an inference would not only be a coercive penalty
making the "assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege 'costly,' "60 but
would effectively negate the application of the privilege as a protection
both for the innocent who fear that ambiguous answers to selected questions or their nervous appearance on the witness stand would tend to
incriminate them and for the guilty who want to leave the full burden of
52. Some states allow comment on the use of the privilege in civil litigation. See,
e.g., Morris v. McClellan, 154 Ala. 639, "45 So. 641 (1908), cited, with approval in
Hinton & Sons v. Strahan, 266 Ala. 307, 96 So. 2d 426 (1957). The majority do not
permit comment, but do allow the jury to draw an inference from a party's silence. See,
e.g., Ikeda v. Curtis, 43 Wash. 2d 449, 261 P.2d 684 (1953).
53. See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 48, at 476; Comment, The Privilege Against SelfIncriminationin Civil Litigation, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 75, 79.
54. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court stated its policy as
follows:
rIllegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing . . .by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only
be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and
literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual
depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more. in sound than in substance.
It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
Id. at 635. This statement was quoted with approval in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511,
515 (1967).
55. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
56. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967), citing Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
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proving their criminal activity on the state.57 Any inference taken from
silence amounts to an assumption that those who avail themselves of
the privilege are either guilty or are perjurors who are using the privilege
to block investigations and protect others although they have no personal

fear of incrimination.5"
The second form of coercion was discussed in a group of civil cases,

two of which were Garrity v. New Jersey59 and Lefkowitz v. Turley."0
These cases concerned economically oriented civil sanctions that were
automatically imposed on those claiming the privilege against self-in-

crimination before a government investigation. 6

"

Such penalties were

not actual inferences of guilt taken at the hearings where defendants'

testimony was desired, but rather cousins to such inferences-assumptions that any person who could not testify freely and fully was guilty of
something and therefore an unsuitable employee who should be removed

from his or her job. The Supreme Court held that these collateral
inferences were coercive in their non-rebuttable, automatic nature, and

that the privilege may not be "condition[ed] by the exaction of a price.

62

Arguably the common factor in these cases is that the government acted

in all of them both as interrogator and imposer of penalties.6" Protection against such a use of governmental power harks back to the fifth
amendment's original purpose of protection from government inquisition
57. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1956), modified,
351 U.S. 944 (1956) (per curiam).
58. Id. at 557.
59. 385 U.S.493 (1967).
60. 414 U.S. 70 (1973). The other cases in the group are: Gardner v. Broderick,
392 U.S. 273 (1968); Spevack v.Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Slochower v. Board of
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
61. In Slochower, a statute required termination of employment of any city employee who did not answer questions related to official conduct. Garrity involved police
who were forced to answer questions or lose their jobs. Spevack involved an attempt
at automatic disbarment of a lawyer who claimed the privilege. In Gardner, discharge
of policemen was threatened if they failed to sign waivers of immunity before appearing
before a grand jury. Finally, the New York contracts in issue in Lefkowitz required
contractors to waive immunity and answer questions concerning state contracts or lose
the right to contract with the state for five years.
62. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967). This line of cases had two
related holdings: first, that such coerced testimony could not be used at a subsequent
criminal trial, and second, that it was not permissible to penalize someone for remaining
silent despite coercion to talk. Compare id. at 497-98, with Slochower v. Board of
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1956).
63. Comment, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 1968
U. ILL. L.F. 75; cf. Comment, Constitutionality of Administrative or Statutory Sanctions
Upon the Exercise of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 36 FoRD. L. Rv. 593
(1968).
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and abuse of governmental power to punish those who failed to cooperate. 64
The fifth amendment right was extended to situations of custodial
interrogation by the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona."
Because of the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation,
Miranda required that the individual subject to such questioning be

first informed of his right to remain silent and the fact that any statement
made can be used against him in a criminal trial.m To ensure that
defendant is aware of his fifth amendment right and is not coerced intb

giving up his opportunity to exercise it, he was granted the right to
consult a lawyer and to have him present at any time during questioning. 67

Mathis v. United States"" applied the Miranda procedures to

custodial interrogation when the reason, for custody was unrelated to
the investigation taking place and when the investigation itself was routine rather than accusatory. 69 Failure to give Miranda warnings pro-

duces the immediate result of barring any self-incriminating evidence
from use at a future criminal trial unless the government can prove a
voluntary waiver of fifth amendment rights.70
In Baxter the Supreme Court looked for the first time at the relationship between the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination

and prison disciplinary hearings. In reconsidering the due process issue
of confrontation and cross-examination, the Court rejected the argument
that the accommodation reached in Wolff 71 should be modified because
.64.
65.
66.
67.

Ratner, supra note 48, at 484-87.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 467-69.
Id. at 469.

68. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
69. Id. at 4-5. Mathis was in prison serving a state sentence when subjected to
a routine federal tax.investigation. Although he was incarcerated on a different charge,
aid it was possible that no criminal charges would arise out of the investigation, the
Court found that the protective rights of Miranda applied and that any information
given in that investigation was barred from future prosecution. Id. at 5.
70. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). The theory behind this action
is that the coercive nature of the situation itself endangers the fifth amendment privilege. Barring the use of coercively obtained evidence is only a partial solution in view
of the intention of Miranda to protect the fifth amendment privilege. It is arguable that
exclusion of tainted evidence is insufficient and that any jurisdiction failing to utilize
the Miranda procedures or their equivalent to protect the fifth amendment could be directed to extend immunity to those who had been coerced into incriminating themselves.
The idea of deliberate defiance of Miranda on the assumption that the evidence would
be inadmissible at a crminal trial but might be of other value presents an entirely different set of problems. See generally Turner & Daniel; Miranda in Prison: The Dilemma
of PrisonDisciplline and IntramuralCrime, 21 ButrALo L. REn'. 759, 770-71 (1972).
71. For a discussion of Wolff, see text accompanying notes 40-44 supra.
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an inmate's interest is weightier when he is faced with possible criminal
prosecution. The Court found instead that the interest of the state
still outbalanced individual interests,7 2and that prison officials must be
left with full discretion in these areas.
Although recognizing that the fifth amendment privilege was
applicable to the Baxter interrogation despite its civil nature because of
the possibility .f future criminal proceedings,7 3 the Court found that the
disciplinary proceeding was neither criminal in itself nor as a stage of a
pending criminal prosecution. The type of coercive inference forbidden
therefore correctly
from criminal trials by the strict holding of Griffinwas
74
found to be inapplicable in this circumstance.
In addition, Justice White, writing for the majority, saw Baxter
and the Garrity-Lefkowitz line of decisions as analytically separable. 75
In those cases the refusal to testify alone resulted in a governmental
sanction. In Baxter, by contrast, silence was assumed to have a connotation but would not result in discipline in the absence of other evidence.7 8 Justice Brennan, in the dissenting portion of his opinion,
asserted that Baxter demonstrates the same use of an impermissible
a penalty for the use of the fifth amendment
government sanction as 77
found in the earlier cases.
Neither of these arguments is lacking in logic. Baxter is indeed
a very different type of case from Garrity, and is not only distinguishable
but should be distinguished on the grounds mentioned by White. There
is a difference between a statute or contract that invalidly provides a set
penalty for constitutionally protected action and an administrative hearing, similar in many ways to a trial, in which some inference taken from
an inmate's silence will become part of the evidence that might result in
disciplinary action. This difference prevents Garrity and the cases
following it from serving as adequate precedent for a decision striking
down the Baxter procedures.
The analysis of Justice Brennan, although it erroneously attempts
to tie Baxter into this group, shows a deeper insight into the problem
72. 96 S. Ct. at 1559-60.
73. Both the majority opinion and the dissent agree that the fifth amendment applied to Palmigiano. Compare 96 S. Ct. at 1557 (majority opinion), with 96 S. Ct. at
1561 (dissenting opinion).
74. 96 S. Ct. at 1557. For a discussion of the philosophy behind the Griffin holding, see text accompanying notes 52-58 supra.
75. 96 S. Ct. at 1557.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1562-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
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presented. The question before the Court was not whether the situation
presented in Baxter involves the Garrity-Lekowitz type of coercion, 78 but
rather whether the procedure used there was impermissibly coercive in
itself. The majority made no comment on the relationship of the facts
of Baxter to the philosophy espoused in Griffin,70 which forbade any
action that will make the exercise of the fifth amendment "costly." Nor
did the Court recognize the apparent inequity of considering constitutionally protected silence to be an inference of guilt when it was intended to benefit the innocent.
Moreover, the Court failed to distinguish between an inference of
guilt arising. out of the silence itself-an inference that would be in
apparent conflict with the history of the fifth amendment privilege and
with its purpose and philosophy as expressed in Griffin-and an inference arisihg out of unrefuted evidence.8 0 If the inference was taken
from defendant's silence,. the majority did not adequately explain its
approval. The assumption was made that the fifth amendment permits
the taking of an inference against a party in a civil action who refuses to
testify,8 1 although the Supreme Court had never previously approved
this practice. No recognition was given to the idea that such inferences
are permissible only because they are taken from unrefuted evidence,
which is not protected by the fifth amendment, and not from the silence
itself. " ' -Furthermore, the knowledge that Rhode Island disciplinary
decisions "must be based on substantial evidence manifested in the
record of the disciplinary proceeding" s3 did not settle the question since
it is unclear whether silence was or was not evidence manifested in the
record. If the Baxter inference was an inference solely from the weight
of the unrefuted evidence and therefore permissible, the facts of the case
demand an investigation both of the sufficiency of the other evidence
to support the decision of the disciplinary board 4 and of the coercive
78. For a discussion of the coercion involved in those cases, see text accompanying
notes 59-64 supra.
79. 380 U.S. at 614.
80. See text accompanying notes 53-58 supra.
81. 96 S. Ct. at 1558.
82. See Comment, Penalizing the Civil Litigant Who Invokes the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 24 V. FLA. L. REv. 541, 549 (1972); Comment, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 75, 79 (1968). Cf.
Note, Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 52 VA. L. REv.
322, 340-41 (1966).
83. 96 S. Ct. at 1557, quoting Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857, 873 (D.R.I.
1970).
84. The disciplinary board's decision was based on reports of prison officials and
Palmigiano's silence. The majority speaks as if the silence did carry some independent
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and misleading nature of the statement that Palmigiano's silence "would
be held against him."- The Court's decision was apparently made
without consideration of any of these problems.
The application of Miranda and Mathis 6 to prison disciplinary
proceedings was summarily dismissed in the Court's consideration of
the availability of counsel. The assurance of counsel was not considered a fifth amendment protection at all, although both the First and
Ninth Circuits had based their decisions on the theory and rule of
Miranda and Mathis.8 7 As the courts of appeals found, the situation in
Baxter approximated that found inherently coercive in Mathis. In both
cases officials questioned a man in prison whose custody was based on
a charge other than that involved in the questioning. In both cases
the questions were part of an investigation that could conceivably lead
to criminal charges, but no criminal charges had yet been brought in
either, and there was a possibility in each that no prosecution would ever
begin. In Mathis, the Court found that the possibility that criminal
prosecutions might result was sufficient to require full Miranda protections, including the presence of counsel to guard against erosion of the
fifth amendment privilege.8 8 In Baxter, on the other hand, the Court
held that the interrogations were not part of a criminal proceeding. 89
This analysis is insufficient to distinguish Baxter from Mathis, which
applied full Miranda protections to a custodial interrogation although
the investigation was a routine one unrelated to the reason for defendants imprisonment. Further, it ignores the fact that the essence of Mathis
and Mirandawas the protection of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, not the assurance of the right to counsel under the
sixth and fourteenth amendments. 90
The Court had previously held that custodial interrogation is
inherently coercive and produces a clear threat to the fifth amendment
weight, although they assume that it would be insufficient in itself for a decision to discipline. See 96 S. Ct. at 1559 n.4, 1564-65 n.6.
85. Id. at 1555. Some indication of the Court's inattention to the power of this
phrase is that the decision initially described the pronouncement as being that the inmate's silence would be held against him, and later said that Palmigiano was told that
his silence could be held against him-a considerably weaker, less intimidating, less
coercive warning. Compare id. at 1555 with id. at 1556.
86. See text accompanying notes 65-70 supra for a discussion of these cases.
87. 96 S. Ct. at 1556.

88. 391 U.S. at 4-5.

89. 96 S. Ct. at 1556.
90. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, 458-66 (1966).
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privilege any time an individual faces the possibility of self-incrimination
at future criminal proceedings. Baxter was a case of custodial interro-"
gation, and the consensus of the Court was that the fifth amendment
applied. 1 It therefore defies logic to decide that the Miranda rights,
set up as protections against threats to the privilege ahd affirmed in a
similar situation in Mathis, do not apply in Baxter. When the Court
eliminated the requirement of counsel in Wolff, it did so through the ise
of a balancing test appropriate to limit the reach of the sixth amendment
through the due process clause. In Baxter the Court erroneously
extended the sixth amendment/due process balancing test to a situation
where -thepresence of counsel was required as a protection for the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Utilization of a valid
limitation of the due process clause to remove any portion of the privilege against self-incrimination tarnishes the respected position of broad
construction and expansive application it has occupied throughout its
history.
The privilege against self-incrimination has always been liberally
construed because a strict construction limits its effectivness. 2 In its
treatment of prison disciplinary hearings, the Supreme Court cut sharply
into the philosophic underpinnings of the privilege by yielding to the
assumption that a party claiming that privilege is guilty or is committing
perjury. 93 Baxter affects a small class of people, but for those prisoners
the Court has taken action that could reduce the privilege to "a hollow
mockery."' 4 Moreover, the area in which the Court has chosen to limit
severely both the absolute application and the effectiveness of the fifth
amendment is one in which the privilege is probably the most necessary:
Innocent men are more likely to plead the privilege in secret proceedings, where they testify without advice of counsel and without
opportunity for cross-examination, than in open court proceedings,
where cross-examination and judicially supervised procedures provide safeguards for the establishing of the whole, as against the
possibility of merely partial, truth. 95
The Court held in Wolff that prisoners faced with disciplinary hearings
were denied the instrumentalities of confrontation, cross-examination,
and counsel necessary to present a defense. After Baxter, an inmate is
91. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
92. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 515 (1967), quoting Boyd v. United

States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
93. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557-59 (1956).
94. Id. at 557.
95. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 422-23 (1957).
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forced to speak and risk incriminating himself both at the disciplinary
hearing and possibly in future criminal proceedings 6 or to keep silent
and accept the burden of giving up his defense while preseriting an
admission of his guilt to the disciplinry board.9 7 The combined effect
of the two decisions is to place the prisoner in a procedural vise from
which there is no foreseeable release.
ELLEN KABCENELL WAYNE

Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976-An Overview of the New Law
As the American consumer credit industry has grown, lawmakers
repeatedly have turned to legislation and regulation in an effort to control abuse and discourage the development of unfair credit policies.'
Part of this effort is represented by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Amendments of 1976,2 passed in March, 1976, only five months after
the original legislation became effective.'
The most ambitious and
controversial amendments expand the existing ban on discriminatory
credit-granting procedures, impose new disclosure requirements on
lending institutions and increase the statutory limits on creditor liability.
Creditors insist that these amendments and the corresponding regu96. In light of the Court's view that Miranda is completely inapplicable to this situation, it is unclear whether the absence of protection for the fifth amendment privilege
would cause self-incriminatory testimony given at a disciplinary procedure to be excluded from a later criminal trial.
97. 328 F. Supp. at 778.
1. Legislation in this area includes the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
of 1974, 12 U.S.C. § 1730f, 1831b, 2601-2617 (Supp. V 1975), and the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 55 1601-1691f (West 1974, Cum. Supp. 1976, Supp.
Pamphlet No. 1 1976, & Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976). The latter encompasses
the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1"601-1667e (West 1974, Cum. Supp. 1976,
Supp. Pamphlet No. 1 1976, & Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976), the Fair Credit
Billing Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 55 1666-1666j (West Cum. Supp. 1976 & Supp. Pamphlet
No. 2, pt. 1 1976), and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 1691-1691f
(West Cum. Supp. 1976 & Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976).
2. Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691-1691f
(West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976)) (amending Equal Credit Opportunity Act
of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691e (Supp. V 1975)) [hereinafter cited as amendments].
3. The original Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691-1691e (Supp.
V 1975), became effective Oct. 28, 1975. Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 707, 88 Stat. 1525
(1974).

